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(Concluded )
THE oldest articulate form of Dualism is the ancient Persian re-
ligion, given to the Persians in the sixth centur}- P. C. by Zoro-
aster, otherwise known as Zarathustra. Reality is conceived as a
struggle between two irreconcilable principles, Light and Darkness,
Good and Evil. This ethical Dualism is represented in the Chris-
tian religion to this da\' in the conception of the conflict between
God and evil, or the personification of evil in the shape of Satan.
The classic example of philosophic Dualism is the philosophy of
Plato. We have already discussed Plato's philosophy under Spir-
itualism, as he is usually classed with the Idealist philosophers, be-
cause of his emphasis upon the supernal realm of the Ideas.
In .Vristotle we find somewhat of an attempt to resolve the
sharply-sundered Dualism into more of a unity. Form has now
taken the place of Idea, and Form can only be realized through the
medium of matter. Matter is that which has the potentiality of
becoming something, while Form is the directive principle which
guides and determines the process of becoming.
Scholasticism, the official ])hilosoph}' of the Roman Catholic
Church, is a modified form of Aristotelianism. Thomas Aquinas,
the thirteenth century scholastic, is the thinker who did the greatest
part of the work of adaptation. The Scholastic philosoj^h}-, with a
few modern revisions, still reigns in Catholic institutions of learn-
ing.
Descartes, the founder of modern philosophy, that is, philosophy
after the Renaissance, was also an exi)onent of Dualism. Reality
is composed of two substances; matter, or extended substance, and
spirit, or thinking substance. The essence of matter is its space-
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filling property, said Descartes, while the essence of spirit is its
property of thought or consciousness. Also, spirit is unextended,
does not fill space. God is the creator of both matter and spirit,
but Himself is a pure spirit. Only man, in the Cartesian scheme,
has a soul. All animals other than man are unconscious chemical
machines, strictly mechanical in their behavior, which is a rigid
mechanism of causes and ettects. Indeed, the entire material world
is a mechanism, capable of being reduced to a realm of cause and
efl:'ect by science, according to Descarto. The material bod\- of man,
too, is a machine. lUit the conduct of this body-machine is some-
how controlled b_\' the soul, which comes in contact with the nervous
S}-stem through its seat in the pineal gland, in the middle of the fore-
head, thought Descartes.
The weak point in Descarte>" sxstem ol)\-iousl\- is his inconsis-
tenc\' in sharply sundering spirit from matter, and then assuming
that spirit can interact with the body-machine and influence its ac-
tions. If the material world, the human bod\' included is a complete
and chjsed circuit of mechanically determined causes and effects,
how can a spiritual cause break its way into the already complete
chain of material causation? How can matter and spirit, b\- defini-
tion belonging to two dift'erent realms of l)eing, act ui)on one an-
other?
Cartesian Dualism, then, pro\e(l to be an unstable i^hilosophv,
owing to the impossibilit}' of accounting for the mteraction of mat-
ter and spirit. The philosophy of Descartes evolved into two other
philosophies. Spinoza resolved the Dualism into a Zionism b\- set-
ting up the hypothesis of a single >ubstance. which is Cod, making
itself known to us by two attributes or aspects, Matter and Spirit.
Another school of philosophers, seizing upon Descartes' idea of
mechanical causation in the material realm of being, founded the
mechanistic philosophw which holds that the universe is a machine,
an iron-clad reign of cause and eft'ect. Spiritual substance was dis-
carded b\- the mechanists as a superfluity. Thev attempted to ex-
plain away the fact of consciousness by reducing it to a motion of
material particles.
The Behaviorist psychology is based on the mechanistic h\ j)oth-
esis. Hence its denial of consciousness, since there is no place for
it in a closed circuit of material causes and eft'ects. A rather dras-
tic wa}- of getting rid of a troublesome fact that does not fit into a
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preconceived theory ! What fact can be more certain than the fun-
damenal fact of consciousness? John B. Watson says that con-
sciousness probably is an illusion. But an illusion itself is a state
of consciousness, a mental state that is wrongly interpreted. If
there were no such thing as consciousness there could be no such
thing as illusion. Therefore in admitting the existence of illusion
Watson is also admitting the existence of consciousness.
Getting back to our subject, Dualism is represented to-day by
Bergson, the Neo-Platonists, the Scholastics, and a few other phi-
losophies of less importance. The Dualism of Bergson demands a
word of notice. The dichotomous division, characteristic of every
form of Dualism, is made between matter and a Life Force, or
Elan J'ital, which pushes its way up through matter in higher and
higher forms of life by means of a process of Creative Evolution.
Bernard Shaw is an adherent of this doctrine. In connection with
the science of biology the theory is known as Vitalism. Biologists
are divided into two camps, the vitalists and the mechanists. The
latter maintain that life is a purely physico-chemical affair, in op-
position to the former, who believe in an Elan J'ital which ani-
mates matter and raises it from the inorganic to the organic level.
We are now ready for a brief discussion of Monism. The word
stands for a philosophical attempt to reduce reality to one prin-
ciple, or one substance. Hence, both Materialism and Spiritual-
ism are forms of Monism, in that they set up either matter or spirit
as the only substance. But in actual philosophical usage the term
Monism is generally reserved for a doctrine which received its
most characteristic expression in Spinoza, the Moorish-Jewish phi-
losopher who lived in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century.
We have already seen how the Dualism of Descartes evolved
into the Monism of Spinoza. The great difficulty inherent in Du-
alistic systems is the problem of accounting for the interaction and
connection of two such sharply-sundered substances as matter and
spirit. Spinoza escaped this difficulty by affirming a single substance
w^hich manifests itself in two attributes, matter and spirit. This
substance he called God, the One, the All. Spinoza's system there-
fore is a Pantheism, since God and the world are one. Dualism is
theistic ; that is, God is conceived of as being apart from and distinct
from the world. Spiritualism obviously is also pantheistic, while
Materalism is atheistic.
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In Spinoza's Monism the problem of the relation of matter to
spirit is solved by assuming the parallelism of the material and
spiritual aspects of the one true substance. Every material ])he-
nomenon has accompan\ing it a parallel psychic phenomenon.
\\'hen a chain of causes and effects passes through a circuit of sense
organs, sensory nerves, brain, and motor nerves, issuing in a mus-
cular response, the material circuit is complete in itself. Ikit ac-
companying this closed material circuit is a parallel circuit of men-
tal causes and effects, composed of sensations, perceptions, voli-
tions, and other states of consciousness. As Huxley has put it,
for every neurosis there must be a psychosis, and vice versa. That
is, for every movement of the particles composing the nervous sys-
tem, there must be a definite accompan}ing state of consciousness
in the psychic aspect of being. In psychology this doctrine is called
psycho-physiological parallelism.
According to S])inoza, not only is every neurosis accompanied
bv a psvchosis, but every physical phenomenon has its correspond-
ing psychical correlate. Thus even atoms and electrons have, in a
verv rudimentary form of course a psychic life. The interconnec-
tion of physical and psychical, of material and spiritual, is very
easily accounted for on this hypothesis. Underlying both matter
and spirit, and fundamental to both of them, is the true reality or
substance, and hence neither material nor spiritual causation is ul-
timate. The true causal activity takes place in the one true sub-
stance, which Spinoza calls God, and manifests itself to us in the
two parallel aspects, known to us as matter and spirit. It follows
that spirit cannot influence matter ; neither can matter influence
spirit. Both must change in parallelism with one another, through
changes in the underlying substance. Body and soul, then, are a
unit, and not two separate things as Dualism contends.
There is no exact prototype of Monism among the ancient phi-
losophers, because the mind-body problem is a comparatively recent
development. The earliest Greek thinkers, Thales, Anaximander,
and Anaximenes, however, somewhat approximate ]\Ionism. The
problem of philosophy for them was to find the one permanent sub-
stance beneath all the diversity of the world. Thales thought that
water was this primal element. Anaximenes held that it was air,
while Anaximander said that the apeiron, the limitless, a sort of
fiery mist, had condensed itself into things as we know them. The
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primal substance, whether water, air, or the hmitless, was aHve.
These early philosophers took this for granted because the dis-
tinction between organic and inorganic, between consciousness and
unconsciousness, had never occurred to them.
The Stoic philosophers held a doctrine also roughl\' similar to
that of Spinoza, inasmuch as they held that the universe is a unity,
animated by the World Reason, of the laws of nature. The Stoics
are best known for their ethical doctrines, which were widely cur-
rent among the Romans before the Empire adopted Christianity.
]\Iarcus Aurelius, the philosopher-emperor and the author of the
famous Mcditaiioiis, was a Stoic. Conformity to Natural Law, or
the World Reason, is the essence of the Stoic ethic. Reality has an
ethical drift, and we must find this drift and live in harmony with
it if we would work out our ethical salvation.
At this point it will be useful to compare the ethics of the sys-
tems of philosoph\ we have so far reviewed. Materialism and Xat-
uralism hold that moral law is social or human law; Dualism finds
moral law in Divine law, or the law of a Ciod or Creator; Monism
maintains that moral law is Natural law. In systems of S[)iritual-
ism, evil is considered either as a necessary step leading to an ul-
timate good ; or else an illusion proceeding from our ignorance of
the ways of the Absolute. Spiritualism has ever found the prob-
lem of evil its great stumbling block, and its ethical theory is more
or less an attempt to explain away evil, rather than to meet it
squarelw
Returning to the subject of Monism, we find that it is still a
live philosoi)h\' to-day. Man\' scientists see in it the only theory
that does full justice to both ])h\sical science and the facts of con-
sciousness and mental life. It is a combination of Materialism and
vSpiritualism, retaining the strong features of both while escaping
their difficulties. Albert Einstein, while not definitely committing
himself to an\' svstem of philosophy, has confessed that he feels
stronglv drawn toward the Pantheism of Spinoza. Two eminent
modern philosophers, S. Alexander and C. Lloyd Morgan, the latter
a noted biologist, are followers of Si)inoza and his Monism.
We are now ready for a brief examination of Sensationalism,
or Phenomenalism as it is also called. P)Oth of the above words
have unfortunate popular connotations. The reader must not sup-
pose that Sensationalism is the philosophy of the modern newspa-
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per man. Philosophic SensationaHsm has no conception \vhate\cr
with journahstic sensationahsm.
In our discussions of Spiritualism ;uid Dualism we were oblii^ed
to anticipate a great deal of our discussion of Phenomenalism, in
order to show the influence of llume, the txpical ])hilosoi)her of
Phenomenalism, on Kant and all later philosophers. This is an-
other instance of the profound inlluence even rival s\stems of
thought exercise upon one anf)ther. It is impossible to discuss a
single one of the fundamental t\i)es of philosophy without bringing
every other type into the discussion. There could be no more con-
\incing refutation of the notion that the diiierent philosophers are
entire!}' out of touch with one another, and that nothing i)ermanent
is ever accomplished in philosophy.
As we have seen. Phenomenalism was introduced into philos-
ophy by David Hume, the eighteenth centur\- Scotch philosopher
and historian. His doctrine was the next step in the evolution of
the thought of Locke and Berkelew
Locke had been a Dualist, maintaining the independent exis-
tence of both mind and matter. Put he left an opening in his s\s-
tem that was to serve as the starting ])oint of his successor, lierkelew
Locke distinguished between the primary and the secondary ([ual-
itie> f)f matter. The primary cpialities were hardness, durability,
and extension in space, while the secondar\ (jualities were color,
sound, odor, etc. Onl\- the ])riniar\- tiualities were obiecti\'e, that
is, belonging to matter in its own right. I'he secondary tjualities
were subjective, or contributed b}- our own minds, beliexed Locke.
P)erkele_\" demonstrated that the so-called primary ([ualities of
matter were just as subjective as the >econdary qualities, and that
all our impressions of matter were mental. Lie dropped the notion
of material substance and reduced realit\- t(j si)iritual or mental sub-
stance alone.
Hume logicalh' completed the evolution of this line of thought
by destroying the notion of spiritual substance. We have already
seen the arguments by which he brought about this result. In a
word, he demonstrated that the notion of spiritual substance under-
l}"ing our sensations, perceptions, volitions, and memories was an
inference that would not hold water logically. Nothing was now
left existing except sensations or phenomena. Hence the terms
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Sensationalism or Phenomenalism in connection with Hume's sys-
tem.
Along with Hume's Phenomenalism went a doctrine of causation
that threatened to knock the foundations from under not only Re-
ligion, but Science as well. If we analyze our notions of cause and
effect carefully, said Hume, w^e can tind no compulsion, no necessity
in any given effect following a given cause. When one billiard
ball strikes another billiard ball we expect the latter to be set into
motion by the former. We think that the effect must of necessit\'
follow the cause. But a little analysis reveals that it is not a cer-
tainty, but only a probabilit}'—a very high probability in this case
—
that ball B will be set into motion by Ball A. Suppose that one
had never seen the collision of two billiard balls, or of two i^ieces
of matter of any kind. Would one be able to deduce beforehand
that ball B would have motion transmitted to it by ball A ? We can
lind no logical reason why any effect should follow from a given
cause. In the above example, to one who had never seen the phe-
nomenon in question, it would be just as logical to suppose that
the second ball would fly oft' into space, or remain stationary while
checking the first ball. Almost anything could be supposed to
happen and pure logic would be powerless to choose between the
alternatives.
In truth, we learn the sequence of any given "cause" and "ef-
fect" relationship only through experience. The mind then asso-
ciates the two, so that when we see A we naturally expect to see
B follow. The greater the number of times our anticipation is ful-
filled, the stronger our mental association of A and B becomes.
But from this we cannot logically deduce that A and B are bound
together by" a causal necessity. All that we can say is that it is
highly probable that B will follow A.
It is through the influence of Hume's above analysis of the
cause and effect relationship, by which he reduced causation to
little more than an association of ideas, that the terms cause and
effect have fallen into disfavor among scientists, and that antece-
dent and consequent have taken their place. The laws of science,
any careful modern scientist will hold, are mere statements of
probability, not rigid, invariable "laws" of nature.
Hume's analysis of causation also had momentous implications
for Religion. The two strongest arguments for the existence of
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God. the cosmological and the ideological arguments, were based
on the older notion of causaHtw In the cosmological proof the
universe was considered the "effect" which only God as a "cause"
could explain. The teleological argument held that the design and
purpose apparently evident in the world pointed to a "cause" in
the form of an intelligent being who did the designing. B\- demol-
ishing the concept of causation and substituting for it the concept
of mere sequence, Hume rendered it impossible to prove the ex-
istence of a Deity. Hume's philosoph\-, then, gave a tremendous
impetus to Agnosticism. Thereafter, belief in God could be only
a matter of faith, faith unassisted b\- reason. It may interest the
reader to know that Hume himself had faith in the existence of God.
There are no ancient prototypes of Phenomenalism, because
that philosophy is a ver}' modern development. The Greek Sophists,
however, somewhat approximated Phenomenalism in their skepti-
cism. Real knowledge is impossible, all knowledge is opinion, be-
lieved most of the Sophists. The most extreme form of this skep-
ticism was that of Gorgias, who said, "Nothing exists; if anvthing
existed it could not be known; if an\ thing could be known it could
not be communicated to others."
Humian Phenomenalism is in great favor to-da\' among a bril-
liant school of philosophers who have approached philosophy
through the gateway of science. Karl Pearson, the English physi-
cist and mathematician ; W'ilhelm Ostwald, the German chemist
;
and Ernst Mach, an Austrian author of great works on physics
and mechanics, have philosophical systems very closely resembling
Hume's Phenomenalism.
Hume was, perhaps, the most influential philosopher in the his-
tory of European philosophy, although that fact is not adequately
realized. Indeed, it can be said without fear of exaggeration that
ever}' system of philosophv after Hume up to the present day bears
unmistakable signs of Hume's influence. We have already seen
how the systems of Kant and the German Idealist were attempts,
in part at least, to escape the skepticism of Plume. Other schools
of philosophy hold that Kant's refutation of Hume was an evasion
rather than a real answer, and hence Hume's doctrines pla}' even a
greater part in the systems other than German Idealism.
\\q have now completed our survey of the fundamental types
of philosophy. It now remains for us to demonstrate how complex
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modern systems of philosophy can be analyzed into their simple
components.
Let us take the philo^oph\• called I'ragmatism, certainly one of
the dominating systems of to-day. Pragmatism also goes under
the names of Humanism, and Instrumentalism. William James is
usually associated with Pragmatism, F. C. S. Schiller with Human-
ism, and John Dewey with Instrumentalism. This difference in
terminology must not be allowed to mislead the reader. Pragma-
tism, Humanism, and Instrumentalism represent what is substan-
tiall\- one s\stem of thought.
Pragmatists (whatever they may call themselves) frecfuentl}'
speak of a doctrine called "radical empiricism." Radical empiri-
cism is a species of Humism or Phenomenalism, in that it holds
that the world of actual experience, the world of sensations and
perceptions, is the real world. When the Pragmatist says that the
world is made of a stuff called "pure experience" he is merely ad-
vancing the doctrine of Phenomenalism.
The most characteristic teaching of Pragmatism is its famous
theory of truth. Truth, according to Pragmatists, is a mental weap-
on forged by the mind for the purpose of gaining control over ex-
perience. I^'or example, the atomic theor\- of chemistr\- is a con-
cept or mental tool which has enabled us to enrich our experience
to a marvellous extent. We all know the role modern chemistry
has played in medicine, industry, and in man}' other walks of life.
It is unessential whether atoms reall\' exist or not. The atomic
theor_\' is true, according to the Pragmatist, because it has proved
such a ])otent instrument in gaining control over our environment
and enhancing the fullness of our lives. Utility and workability-
are the principal tests of truth.
This doctrine of truth is not new by any means. It was hinted
by one of the ancient Greek Sophists, Protagoras, who said, "Man
is the measure of all things." The Pragmatic view of truth is a
natural development proceeding from the skepticism of Hume. If
^ve can have no knowledge other than that of probabilities and se-
quences, it behooves us to accept those sec|uences as true which it
is useful for us to accept as true.
Let us subject the system of Bertrand Russell to our method of
chemical analysis. We find that Russell's views on ethics and re-
ligion are similar to those of Epicurus. Moral codes and systems
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are merelv human devices for securing the maximum of happiness
for man ; rehgion to RusseU is a species of fear, which it is to
man's interest to leave behind him. The world, according to Rus-
sell, is made of a stuff that is neither mind nor matter. "Neutral
monism" is the name given this doctrine. This neutral stuff' consists
of "events." The entire conception is a variety of Humian Phe-
nomenalism, for the "events" are phenomena or sensations. Russell
places great faith in the absolute nature of mathematical truth,
which he holds is independent of experience. In this respect, then,
Russell is somewhat of a Platonist, since he affirms the independent
existence of abstract ideas in the form of mathematical propositions.
Thus the philosophical system of Bertrand Russell is a compound
of Naturalism, Phenomenalism, and Platonism.
What are some of the benefits that would accrue from a more
widespread interest in philosophy? Has philosophy any practical
value ?
The reading of the philosophers cannot help ha\ing a beneficent
eft'ect on one's character and ideals. Contact with the great phi-
losophers, who were invariabl\- men of the loftiest character and
the highest moral idealism, is an experience full)' as worthwhile
as contact with the great minds of literature, music, and art. The
calm, quiet pleasures of reflection and study come to be valued more
highh' than the degrading pleasures of modern life. Our hurried,
but withal aimless, lives, are largely- the outcome of false valua-
tions and ideals. The lust for material gain is largely responsible
for the feverish tempo of modern life. A truer sense ot values,
which the stud_\- of philosophy can hardl}" fail to instil, would do
much toward freeing man's mind of the low ideals and petty ma-
terial ambitions which are responsible for so many of the ills of
modern society.
